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Speech of 
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE NlW ADMINISTRATION 
Senator Mike Mansfi~ld (D., Montana) to b~ dzliv2r~d 
Duquasne University La>J Alumni Banquat 
Monday, April 24, 1961 
8 p.m. 
Pittsb~rgh, Pennsylvania 
at the 
Tha responsibility for the conduct of our relations with 
other nations r~sts only t1ith the Administration in poHer. The 
President assumes this responsibility uhen he tak.:!s offica on January 
20th. But foreign policy does not com9 to an end with ona Administra-
tion and begin anew with the next. The slate is not wiped clean avary 
four years. There is a continuity of the problems ,,hich confront the 
nation fro,n abroad and a continuity of the responses of O•' r govarnment 
to these problems from one Ad,ninistration to another. 
This is not to say that a partic~lar Administration will not 
stamp tha course of foreign policy with the brand of its own ideas. 
The process, however, is a slow ona. It is slo~ partly bacausa the 
problems which we fac a abroad are not of our exclusiva creation and , 
hence, are not a menabla to our axclusiva remedias. And, partly, it is 
slm~ because the impact of the ideas of a new Administration must per-
meate a large and camp l 9x bureaucracy ~vithin o 1r o-..m government before 
they make thems~lves felt in action on the problems to ,,hich they are 
dirac ted. 
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We can grasp the significance of this continuity in fore ign 
policy by reference to recent events in Cuba and in Laos. In the one 
instance, Presi dent Kennedy had urged an Alliance for Progress of all 
the American Republics. Within this concept, he presented a broad and 
cohesive outline for a cooperative advance in the relations of the 
nations of the Western Hemisphere. The presentation was wel l -received 
by other Republics of the Americas. New vistas of common benefit were 
opened by it. 
Nevertheless, within ninety days of the President's taking 
office we were not yet at the beginning of this peaceful advance but 
rather face-to-face with a military crisis in Cuba brought about by 
the launching of an invasion of anti-Castro forces. Instead of being 
in a position to move forward on a new constructive approach to all of 
Latin America, the Administration was compelled to direct its attention 
to a critical juncture in our relations with one nation of the ~egion. 
This juncture was reached during thisAdministration. But 
the roads leading to it began many months ago. The juncture represented 
the culminat ion of an accumulation of hostility on the part of Cuba to 
this nation and an accumulation of our reaponses to that hostility . 
On the other side of the globe, in Laos, somethi ng similar 
has transpired. In fact, this situation had already reached the point 
of crisis even before the new Administration took office. It had reached 
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this stage because in preceding years a peaceful land, once remote 
from the rest of the world, had been turned into a bone of contention 
in the larger clash of ideologies and power elsewhere in the world. 
As a result the people of Laos who until recent years had scarcely 
ever heard a shot fired in anger found themselves the focal point 
of steadily converging military forces from outside. Military clashes 
in Laos which produced the immediate crisis involved but a handful of 
men. But these clashes opened fissures with large implications for 
world peace. 
The direct involvement of the Soviet Union in Laos as a 
supplier of military aid to Laotian factions was one factor in produc-
ing the crisis and a factor of comparatively recent vintage. But it 
was preceded by the involvement of the Chinese-supported North 
Vietnamese government for a long time in a similar role. The sum total 
of this outside communist-involvement in the local Laotian situation 
and its progressive enlargement is not measurable, But our own progres-
sive involvement will give us some insight into the process by t11hich 
the Laotians were plucked from the obscurity of remote Southeast Asia 
and steadily moved into a focus of world-wide significance. 
\.Jhen I first visited Laos in 1953, there were only 2 American. 
junior officials in the entire country. There was no aid program to 
and, 
speak of/ may I add, no Laotian army to speak of, to aid. But 
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seven years later, by the time the Laotian crisis broke in full force 
in the very last days of the Eisenhower Administration, there were in 
Laos hundreds of u.s. officials of several agencies and departments. 
We had expended hundreds of millions of dollars on aid, largely for 
military purposes. We had financed the training of thousands of Laotian 
soldiers. And, finally, our own naval and other forces had converged in 
the general vicinity of Laos because of the steady advance of communist-
oriented Laotians in the country. This vast commitment of our resources, 
not unlike tha.t cf th~ Cotm!'unists, had little to do with either the needs 
or realities of the situation in Laos. It had much to do with winning 
hollow propaganda victories in the cold war. 
To this situation, too, President Kennedy brought new ideas. 
In specifics he worked with the United Kingdom and India in an effort 
to bring about a cease-fire and the neutralization of Laos. In other 
words, he sought to take Laos out of the cold war. Left to their own 
devices, the Laotian people would ask for nothing more. From the point 
of view of the great powers this solution would mark a significant step 
towards a more rational world situation, one which anyone of them could 
take in the interests of peace with little, if any, sacrifice of significant 
national interests. 
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The initial Soviet reaction to this proposal seemed favorable 
enough. Nevertheless, in the uorking out of the details through the 
existing channels of diplomacy, >veeks of delay have ensued. 
All the vrhile, professions of the desire for peace in laos 
have continued and all the vhile, the fighting has continued in that 
country. All the ••hile, the jockeying for some assumed advantage has 
gone on by much the same responses with which this situation has been 
dealt for years . 
The crises in laos and Cuba reveal vividly the continuity 
of both the prcblems and responses in foreign policy and the difficul-
ties of altering either overnight. ~li thout vishing to downgrade the 
seriousness of either situation, I must emphasize, however, that they 
are but a fractional part of a larger picture. Behind Cuba stands the 
vast panorama of continuing difficulties and a continuing inadequacy 
of response to them vrith respect to all of latin America . Yet this far 
more significant picture can be overlooked in a fixation on the sensa-
tional developments >rithin the troubled island just ninety miles off 
our shores. ~.Je have managed to live vri th a militantly hostile Cuba 
for tvro years . I do not believe vre could live very vell for two days 
with a militantly hostile latin knerica. 
Yet, vrhat has happened in Cuba under Castro can occur in 
other latin American countries. The seed of Castroism is compounded 
of ruthless totalitarian technique plus messianic indigenous leadership, 
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plus support from outside this Hemisphere. It is doubtful that this 
seed can grow except in the soil of social and economic discontent. 
Unfortunately such soil covers much of Latin America, from the Caribbean 
shores down the great spine of the Andes. 
It is at least conceivable that this Hemisphere can be insulated 
from 
from a flow/without of material support to totalitarian forces within 
but the task •..;rould be immensely diffi.cult and costly and of only limited 
efficacy. It is not conceivable, hmo1ever, that in this day and age of 
instant and easy communications, this Hemisphere can be isolated from 
the transference of totalitarian techniques from elsewhere . Nor can 
the appearance of messianic indigenous leadership in Latin American 
countries be forestalled because what is indigenous to Latin America is 
by definition beyond the control of this nation. 
If it is to our interests--and it is--to prevent the spread of 
a divisive and hostile totalitarianism throughout the Hemisphere, there 
is one point at which a check may be feasible. That point is where a 
cooperative effort with others renders the soil of the Americas infertile 
to the seed of totalitarianism before it takes root. And in substance, 
that is the idea which the President expressed in such comprehensive 
form a few weeks ago in his speech on an Alliance for Progress in the 
1-Jestern Hemisphere, It is one thing to advance this idea. It is another 
to bring it to fruition--to promote that economic and social progress 
which alone promises the removal of the acids of mass discontent from 
the soil of this Hemisphere. 
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There \vas much to do .1ith respect to social and economic 
conditions in Latin Am~rica before this Administration took of fica. 
After the recent d~velopments in Cuba there is still much to do. Time 
was short when this Administration took over. Now it may b~ even shorter. 
If the situation in Latin America is to ba altar~d so that it 
will no longzr provid~ an incubus for totalitarianism then a great effort 
m-Jst be made along the lines of thz allianc~ for progress proposal \vhich 
the Presid~nt has advancai and that effort mJst b~gin to take concrete 
form in the very near futu·:e. The effort, moreovar, must be a coopera-
tive one because the stake of Latin Americans is far greater and more 
direct than our mvn and, in great part, the situation is amenable to 
change only as Latin Americans are tJilling to change it, But if th~y 
are willing to do what must be done for freedom and progress within 
their own countries, then the stake of this nation in the future of this 
He 1isphere is S'JCh that we must b~ prepared to join with them in the 
effort. I knmv that the President is so prepared. Are the rest of •Js 
also prepared? If wa, no lass than the Latin Am2ricans, are willing to 
face the dimensions of the difficulties and act in concert on th~m, than 
the President's ideas of an Alliance for Prograss can be and ~•ill b e in-
terpret~d into effective action. 
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Not unlike Cuba, the crisis in laos is but the visible ti:p of 
a vast iceberg involving the mainland of i'lestern Asia. It is not only 
in laos that the conditions of peace do not yet 0xist. We may see them, 
there,now in striking form.. But if we look beneath the tip, vre will 
see that the difficulties Hhich confront us, particularly, fork out from 
laos into Thailand and even more so into Viet Nam. Nor do they and at 
the sea off Southeast Asia. The conditions of peace in any reliable sense 
do not exist at Formosa or in Korea any more than in Viet Nam or laos. 
In all of these situations, the new Administration begins with what may 
best be described as the response of the holding action. Such stability 
as exists in them, in part, is knitted together with huge aid-programs 
of one kind or another, backed >-ri th a heavy deployment of our own military 
forces in the general area. 
At best, these situations will remain uncertain for some time 
to come. At best, the response which vre have heretofore given to them 
will have to be continued for some time to come . It is not yet clear to 
1·rhat extent these situations can be altered in the direction of a more 
durable and :!.ess costly peace by more effective diplomacy but I am con-
fident that the President vill not hesitate to bring to bear nevr ideas 
to that end. We shall not knmr the possibilities until ideas have been 
tested and, I may add, that this testing has already begun in laos. 
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It will be a cautious process--this testing--because the 
Presidant is a prudent man who has uppermost in mind the security of this 
nation. It will be a slow process for reasons which I have already set 
forth. But if it is possible to achieve a more stable and less costly 
peace in the Far East, I know that the President will leave no stone un-
turned in his efforts to achieve it. 
What applies to Latin America and to the Southeast Asia and the 
Far East, applies also to Europe and to Africa. We have been involved 
deeply in the problems of the former for a long time. In the last year 
or two we have become involved significantly in the problems of the 
latter. I shall not, today, go into the details of the situation which 
confronts us on these cont inents. Nevertheless, I would point out by 
way of example that the division of Berlin and Germany has not disappeared 
with the advent of a new Administration. Nor have the weaknesses in N/30 
dissolved merely because we have installed a new President. Nor have 
the Eastern European nations yet obtained that degree of national freedom of 
action which permits a full measure of contact with Western Europe , a con-
dition which must prevail if there is to be a sound peace on that continent. 
I shell not go into detail, either, en the vastly complicated 
problems of trying to bring control over the weapons of mass destruction 
and a measure of reduction in the great burden of taxation on our people 
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and all peoples vrhich is entailed in billions upon billions of armaments 
expenditures. These problems vrere complex on the day this Administration 
took office. They grow more complex as each day passes ~vi thout the be-
ginnings of a solution. 
As with Latin America and Southeast Asia, the President may be 
expected to bring to bear new ideas on all of these problems of foreign 
policy which he inherits. Indeed, some ideas already have been initiated. 
The process of making these ideas effective, however, is, as I have already 
noted, at best a slow one. After years of close observation, moreover, I 
am .personally persuaded that the machinery of this process vri thin the 
Executive Branch of this government has grown so cumbersome and ineffective 
that there is grave danger to the principle of responsible leadership by 
the President. I would hope, therefore, that this A&ninistration would 
proceed promptly to a thorough overhaul of the machinery of intelligence 
which functions in many Departments and Agencies in a fashion which deeply 
influences foreign policy and its conduct. 
I 1·rould hope, further, that the machinery for the countless 
secondary decisions of policy through which the President's ideas and 
primary decisions would be thoroughly overhauled and streamlined and 
that the preponderant responsibility in these matters 1vould be lodged 
where it has not been for many years--in the office of the Secretary of 
State. 
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The difficulties which we face in the world are immense. 
The responsibility of the President in connection with them are 
enormous. He carries the ultimate burden for all of us-Democrats 
and Republicans alike. He has a right to expect general support in 
these matters, a support which must include, may I say, constructive 
criticism in matters of foreign policy. 
I want to say that he has had that kind of support in Congress 
for the first three months that he has been in office. He has had it 
from Democrats and Republicans alike. I am confident that he has it 
and will continue to have it from the people of the U,lited States. 
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